DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICSDoes Money Make People Right-Wing and Inegalitarian? A Longitudinal Study of Lottery Winners by Nattavudh Powdthavee et al.
 
 
Does Money Make People Right-Wing and Inegalitarian? A 
Longitudinal Study of Lottery Winners 
 
Nattavudh Powdthavee &Andrew J. Oswald 
 
No 1039 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 1 
 
 
 
Does Money Make People Right-Wing and Inegalitarian? A Longitudinal  
Study of Lottery Winners 
 
 
 
Nattavudh Powdthavee* 
Andrew J. Oswald** 
 
February 2014 
 
Abstract 
The  causes  of  people’s  political  attitudes  are  largely  unknown.    We  study  this  issue  by 
exploiting longitudinal data on lottery winners.  Comparing people before and after a lottery 
windfall, we show that winners tend to switch towards support for a right-wing political party 
and to become less egalitarian.  The larger the win, the more people tilt to the right.  This 
relationship is robust to (i) different ways of defining right-wing, (ii) a variety of estimation 
methods, and (iii) methods that condition on the person previously having voted left.   It is 
strongest for males.  Our findings are consistent with the view that voting is driven partly by 
human self-interest.  Money apparently makes people more right-wing.  
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Does Money Make People Right-Wing and Inegalitarian? A Longitudinal  
Study of Lottery Winners 
 
“I made so much money betting on the Labour party to win the election that I was able to become a Conservative.”  Anon. 
 
1. Introduction 
Voting is the foundation of modern democracy.  The causal roots of people’s political 
preferences,  however,  are  imperfectly  understood.    One  possibility  is  that  individuals’ 
attitudes  to  politics  and  redistribution  are  motivated  by  deeply  ethical  views.    Another 
possibility -- perhaps the archetypal economist’s presumption -- is that voting choices are 
made out of self-interest and then come to be embroidered in the mind with a form of moral 
rhetoric.  Testing between these two alternative theories is important intellectually.  It is also 
inherently difficult.  That is because so many of our attitudes as humans could stem from 
early in life and are close to being, in the eyes of the econometrician, a person fixed-effect.   
This study proposes a new empirical test.  It provides longitudinal evidence consistent 
with the second, and some might argue more jaundiced, view of human beings.  We exploit a 
panel data set in which people’s political attitudes are recorded annually.  In the data set, 
some individuals serendipitously receive lottery windfalls.  We find that the larger is their 
lottery  win,  the  greater  is  that  person’s  subsequent  tendency,  after  controlling  for  other 
influences, to switch their political views from left to right.  We also provide evidence that 
lottery winners are more sympathetic to the belief that ordinary people ‘already get a fair 
share of society’s wealth’.   
Access  to  longitudinal  information  gives  us  advantages  denied  to  most  previous 
researchers on this topic.  It is possible to observe people’s political attitudes before and after 
events.  Although panel data cannot resolve every difficulty of establishing cause-and-effect 
relationships, they in general allow sharper testing than do cross-section data.  Our inquiry 
combines panel data with a randomized-income element that stems from the nature of lottery 
windfalls.  This study is thus robust to the concern that omitted fixed-effect factors might 4 
 
explain  the  different  political  attitudes  of  large  and  small  winners.    One  reason  this  is 
important is because it seems plausible that personality might determine both the number of 
lottery tickets bought and the political attitudes of the person, and this might thereby lead to a 
possible spurious association between winning and right-leaning views.  We provide, among 
other kinds of evidence, a simple graphical demonstration that winners disproportionately 
lean to the right having previously not been right-wing supporters. 
The study draws upon a nationally representative sample from the British population.  
In the later regression equations we focus particularly upon a sub-sample of people (a fairly 
large proportion, given the lottery’s popularity in Great Britain) who have ever had a lottery 
win.  Within this group, we are especially interested in the observed longitudinal changes in 
political  allegiance  of  the  bigger  winners  compared  to  the  smaller  winners.  Our  key 
information stems from 541 observations on lottery wins larger than 500 pounds.   
2.  Background 
The fact that high income and right-wing views are positively correlated in a cross-
section has been repeatedly documented in quantitative social science (recently, for example, 
by Brooks and Brady 1999 and Gelman et al. 2007 in US data, and by Evans and Tilley 2012 
in British data).  A somewhat analogous result is reported, using quite different kinds of 
methods, in Karabarbounis (2011).  The difficulty is to know how to interpret this famous 
correlation of political science.  Is it truly cause-and-effect, and if so in what direction?   
Our  inquiry  fits  into  a  modern  literature  that  tries  to  distinguish  causal  from 
correlational  relationships  in  people’s  voting  patterns.    Dunning  (2008)  describes  the 
methodological ideas in the early literature.  Examples of recent contributions are Erikson 
and Stoker (2011), who look at the influence of Vietnam lottery-draft numbers, and Oswald 
and Powdthavee (2010), who study the longitudinal influence of having daughters rather than 
sons. 5 
 
A particularly relevant study1 for our work is the cross-sectional paper of Doherty, 
Gerber and Green (2006).  These researchers examine the political views of approximately 
340  American  lottery  winners.    Although  the  authors  have  point-in-time  rather  than 
longitudinal data, so are unable to observe switching, they document evidence of hostility 
among US lottery winners -- compared to a set of selected control individuals -- to certain 
kinds  of  taxation,  especially  to  estate  taxes.    The  authors  do  not  test  for  a 
Republican/Democrat split; but they give some evidence, of a kind that is on the margin of 
statistical significance, that their lottery winners do not favour government-led redistribution.  
The Doherty  et  al.  (2006) paper also  gives a  fine account  of the strengths  and potential 
weaknesses of lottery studies.  As the authors explain, a difficulty with inference from cross-
sections of lottery winners is that the winners who agree to take part in a study may not be 
identical to the ideal cross-section of control individuals who did not win. 
 More broadly, this paper fits within a tradition of work on the nature of endogenous 
preferences in human beings (see, for instance, Bowles 1998). 
3. A Possible Analytical Framework 
    As an aid to thinking, consider a stylized model in which it is rational for different 
kinds  of  people  to  vote  in  different  ways.    The  framework  has  an  economic  flavour.  
Intuitively, what happens behind the formal analytics is that, because by assumption,  
  some individuals have higher income 
  some people derive greater utility from public goods like a national health system and 
community safety2, 
                                                 
1 We discovered this fairly late in our own work and realized we were some years behind these authors in having the idea of 
studying political attitudes and lottery windfalls.  Our work follows in a lottery-study tradition in social science exemplified 
by studies such as Brickman et al. (1978), Imbens et al. (2001), Lindahl (2005), Gardner and Oswald (2007), Apouey and 
Clark (2011), Hankins et al. (2011), and Kuhn et al. (2011).  It is also related to research on redistributional preferences such 
as Alesina and Ferrara (2005) and Alesina et al. (2012).    
2 Another case might be that of state pensions and medical care, which, because females live longer than males, are of 
natural particular concern to women. 6 
 
it is possible to consider analytically the likely relationships between income and political 
views.  We will have in mind a class of individuals who put a high weight on publicly 
provided goods (they will have a high ‘g-parameter’ in the later model), and will also later 
appeal to informal evidence that females may fall into this category more commonly than 
males.  Our paper assumes,  in  the tradition  of economic modelling and of some work in 
political science, that people optimize as if conscious of their motives. In practice, we would 
accept, such forces may instead operate at a subconscious level.         
Consider a world in which individuals earn real income y and there is an amount of 
public good denoted P.  The public good -- it might be thought of as a service like state-
sponsored medical care in old age -- is funded out of tax revenue.  It is paid for out of tax 
revenue.  The revenue is raised from a single tax rate, t, levied on personal income.   
Let the political shade of government in this world be captured by a single variable, r, 
the shade of ‘red’ of this society.3   
Assume the existence of a monotonic relationship  P(t) between the supply of the 
public good and the tax rate.  This is increasing and differentiable: greater income taxes lead 
to  a larger supply  of the public  good.  Define  a left-wing society, with  a high value of 
redness, r, as one that provides a relatively large amount of the public good and funds this 
with a relatively high tax rate on income.  Right-wing societies, by contrast, have low P and 
low t.  Let the tax rate be t = t(r), and assume the tax function t(r) is increasing, monotonic, 
and differentiable.  Write the amount of the public good  
) ( )) ( ( r p r t P P            (1) 
namely as a reduced-form function of the political shade of the society. 
 Consider a rational voter.  Assume he or she likes both public and private goods, and 
has separable utility function 
                                                 
3 We use red in the historical sense that goes back at least to the era of Karl Marx, not in the sense used in recent US 
Democrat-Republican conventions.   7 
 
)) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( t y u g P gv V            (2)   
where the function v(P) captures the utility from the public good, u(.) is a differentiable, 
increasing,  and  weakly  concave  utility  function  defined  on  net  private  income,  g  is  a 
preference parameter that lies between zero and unity and denotes the marginal preference 
the person has for public over private goods.  Assume v(.) is differentiable, increasing, and 
strictly concave.   
In choosing a society’s optimal political colour, r, this voter balances a desire for low 
taxes with a desire for the public good.  The utility maximization decision is the choice of the 
level of r that maximizes: 
))) ( 1 ( ( ) 1 ( )) ( ( r t y u g r p gv V              (3) 
so that the voter’s optimal choice of the redness of a government is given by the condition 
0 ) ( ))) ( 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( )) ( (         


r t y r t y u g r p r p v g
r
V
       (4) 
after assuming, as will be done throughout, that the citizen’s maximand V(r, y, g) is concave 
in r and is well-behaved.   
From this, we have:  
Proposition 
(i)  Assume the individual has relative risk aversion of less (more) than unity.  Then 
the greater is that person’s income, y, the less (more) left-wing is the person. 
(ii)   The greater is parameter g, the more left-wing are individuals 
(iii)   In the limit, as g goes to unity, a rise in income y has no effect on the person’s 
left-wingness. 
 
To establish these results, consider income, y.  The sign of the cross-partial derivative of the 
maximand V(r, y, g) with respect to r and y is given by the sign of the term  
) ( )) ( 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ( ) 1 ( r t r t y u g r t y r t y u g                   (5) 
which may be rewritten as 
))] ( 1 ( ( )) ( 1 ( ( )[ ( ) 1 ( r t y u y r t y u r t g                    (6) 8 
 
so this expression can, in principle, take either sign.   
However, if in expression (6) the term in square brackets is negative, which is simply 
the requirement that the degree of risk aversion exceeds unity, then expression (6) is positive 
overall, because (1-g) is non-negative and so is the derivative of t(r).  This in turn establishes 
the early part of the proposition.  
The sign of the cross-partial derivative of the maximand V(r, y, g) with respect to r 
and g is given by the term  
0 ) ( )) ( 1 ( ( ) ( )) ( (        r t y r t y u r p r p v        (7) 
which,  because  expression  (7)  is  unambiguously  positive,  establishes  the  proposition’s 
second part.   
The third and final part of the proposition follows simply from  expression (5) as 
1  g .    
These methods rely on the existence of differentiable cross-partials4 of the maximand 
but the general argument goes through without differentiability of V.   
The framework described above is a deliberately simple one and rests on a form of 
individual rationality.  The conceptual set-up is not designed to explain details of the political 
world.  Instead the aim is to try to contribute to thinking about possible sources of voting 
differences -- to allow us to think about averages and trends within a population.  
4. Testing  
The main data source used in the analysis is the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS)5.  This is a nationally representative random sample o f households, containing over 
25,000 unique adult individuals, conducted between September and Christmas of each year 
from 1991 (see Taylor et al 2002).   
                                                 
4 The first-order condition for maximizing J(x,a) is Jx = 0.  Around that turning point, Jxxdx + Jxada = 0, which can be written 
simply as dx/da = -Jxa/Jxx.  But Jxx is negative by the second-order condition for a maximum.  Hence the sign of the 
comparative static result dx/da is determined solely by the sign of the cross-partial Jxa. 
5 The BHPS is freely available for download after registration at www.data-archive.ac.uk.  9 
 
Respondents are interviewed in successive waves; households who move to a new 
residence are interviewed at their new location; if an individual splits off from the original 
household, the adult members of their new household are also interviewed.  Children are 
interviewed once they reach 11 years old.  The sample has remained representative of the 
British population since the early 1990s.  Data on political preferences in the BHPS have 
been collected from 1991, whilst data on lottery wins were collected for the first time in 
1997. Relatively little research appears to have been done on political preferences in BHPS 
data.  Exceptions are Sanders and Brynin (1999) and the work of Johnston (2005) and co-
authors.  These did not study lottery windfalls.  
The data set provides 184,045 observations (27,966 unique adult individuals) in the 
entire unbalanced panel of BHPS.  Of those, in 89,218 observations (17,372 individuals) 
people stated support for either the Labour or the Conservative party.  Our main sample for 
analysis includes lottery winners at the year of their winning who also stated support for 
either  the  Labour  or  the  Conservative  party.  This  produces  9,003  observations  (4,277 
individuals).  Of those, 94.65% are small wins (£1-£499), and 5.35% are medium to big wins 
(£500+).  Many people also won money from the lottery more than once in our panel.  For 
example,  from  1997,  the  average  number  of  ‘years  of  winning  the  lottery’  for  the  same 
person is 2.12 years, with a standard deviation of approximately 2.2 years.  This implies that 
there are likely to be some individuals who repeatedly play.  In the econometric estimation, it 
will thus be desirable to have a method that compares within-individual rather than across 
(potentially intrinsically different kinds of) people.  One reason why we later focus on lottery 
winners at the year of winning is because the BHPS does not contain information about the 
number of times (if any) the individual has played the lottery.6  Hence, we cannot distinguish 
non-players from unsuccessful players.   Also, rather than being unsuccessful in the past, 
                                                 
6 For a discussion on this, see Apouey and Clark (2011). 10 
 
winners at time t may not have necessarily played at t-1, thus making the within-person 
comparison between winning at t and not winning at t-1 potentially difficult.  Nevertheless, 
in Britain, as opposed to a number of other countries, many people play lotteries; a recent 
survey-based estimate by Wardle et al. (2007) places the figure of lottery players at two-third 
of the entire British adults, with 57% of the population playing the National Lottery (and 
almost 60% of these playing at least once a week).  This explains why there is a considerable 
number  of  repeated  lottery  winners  in  the  BHPS  data  compared  to  any  other  nationally 
representative data sets. Our study’s main identification strategy relies on the within-person 
comparison between winning at t and winning at t-k, where k = 1, …, n. 
One survey question that can be used (#AV8 in the survey) is as follows, with, for 
illustration, British people’s mean answers given for the year 1991: 
Which party do you regard yourself as being closer to than the others?  
Conservative   
Labour   
Liberal Democrats   
Scottish National Party   
Plaid Cymru   
Green Party   
Other Parties   
Other answer   
Hence non-response is a tiny category. 
Entire BHPS sample  All  Women  Men 
Conservative  22.1%  20.4%  21.7% 
Labour  35.2%  34.8%  35.6% 
Lib Dem/lib/SDP  11.2%  11.8%  10.5% 
Scot Nat  3.4%  3.2%  3.9% 
Plaid Cymru  1.5%  1.6%  1.5% 
Green party  1.3%  1.4%  1.1% 
Other party  1.0%  0.7%  1.5% 11 
 
Other answer  0.4%  0.3%  0.4% 
None  14.3%  15.5%  14.0% 
Can't vote  0.3%  0.3%  0.2% 
Ulster unionist  2.9%  3.1%  3.1% 
SDLP  2.3%  2.7%  2.2% 
Alliance party  0.7%  0.8%  0.6% 
Democratic Unionist  1.8%  1.9%  2.0% 
Sinn Fein  1.0%  1.0%  1.2% 
Other party  0.4%  0.5%  0.4% 
N  155,720  78,919  67,765 
 
However, it is also possible to use a different question.  In much of the later analysis 
we measure ‘right-wing’ by using the expressed strength of support for the Conservative 
Party.   We measure ‘left-wing’ by using individuals’ expressed support for the Labour Party.  
This leaves the case, in particular, of those voters who favour the centrist Liberal Democrat 
Party.  In the empirical analysis we experimented by including these ‘LibDem’ voters in, or 
not in, the Right; the results are not sensitive to that.  Because they are hard to classify on a 
political left-right scale, and numbers are tiny, individual voters for other political parties, 
such as the Green Party, are eventually eliminated from the data.   
A  simple  binary  voting  variable  has  one  scientific  disadvantage.    It  provides  no 
information about the strength of feeling of the measured individual.  By its nature, a binary 
variable  therefore  cannot  reveal  information  about  those  Labour  voters  who  are  close  to 
tipping into being Conservatives, or vice versa.  This means it is more difficult, especially in 
a fixed-effects framework, to detect movements in political opinion as life shocks hit the 
individual.  
For this reason, in much of the paper we use an outcome variable that captures more 
discerningly the strength of right-wing or left-wing support.  This is done by drawing on 
individuals’ responses to the following survey question:  
“Would you call yourself a very strong supporter of (Party reported to be closest to)? 1 = 
very strong; 2 = fairly strong; 3 = not very strong.”  12 
 
The question allows us to create a cardinal variable for the ‘strength of right-wing support 
versus left-wing support’ variable, whereby 1 = very strong supporter of the Labour Party, 
…, 4 = neutral, …, 7 = very strong supporter of the Conservative Party.”  Among lottery 
winners, we find that 3.6% strongly support the Labour Party; 18.1% fairly strongly support 
the Labour Party; 28.9% do not very strongly support the Labour Party; 13.4% are neutral 
supporters of either party; 23% do not very strongly support the Conservative Party; 10.8% 
fairly strongly support the Conservative Party; and 2.1% strongly support the Conservative 
Party. 
By the standards of the long history of political science, our study’s approach is a 
simple one.  We would have some sympathy for the criticism that it is arguably not possible 
in this way, or perhaps in any elementary statistical way, to do justice to the complexities of 
human beings’ political preferences.  Nevertheless, a trade-off exists here between tractability 
and  generality.    There  is  agreement  in  Great  Britain  that  Labour  is  to  the  left  (it  has 
traditionally promoted socialist ideas) and the Conservatives are to the right (it has promoted 
the free market).  The Liberal Democrats are harder to classify, and inherently in between the 
two larger parties on a number of issues, but over this period they may have been seen as 
closer to the left than the right.  Paradoxically, at the time of writing, the Lib Dems are in 
coalition with the right-wing Conservative party.  That is unusual in modern British history.  
Empirically, we try various aggregations of the Liberal Democrats with other parties.  The 
results of our paper do not rest sensitively upon any such aggregation.  As we show, a range 
of taxonomies lead to the same broad conclusion.   
In any year of the British Household Panel, a considerable number of voters say they 
are undecided or have no preferences for any political parties.  The typical percentage is 12%.  
We assume in the paper that this kind of undecided-ness is inevitable when doing empirical 
work  on  political  preferences,  and,  for  simplicity,  later  generally  leave  aside  these 13 
 
observations.  In this study we do not address the issue of whether the individual survey 
respondent is happier when his or her political party is in power, though it is arguably natural 
to assume so (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005 find evidence for that in Western Europe).   
In later results, we will see some differences between men and women.  These could, 
in  principle,  relate  back  to  the  g  parameter  in  the  analytical  framework.    For  example, 
interesting  recent  work  by  Campbell  (2004)  documents  systematic  gender  differences  in 
modern British political attitudes.  The author tabulates answers given in the British Election 
Survey of 2001.  She shows that the single most-important political concern to males is that 
of low taxes.  For females, by contrast, it is the quality of the National Health Service.  Norris 
(2002) documents the gradual shift to the left of women in Britain’s politics since World War 
2.  
In the entire adult sample (including lottery winners), approximately 32% of men, as 
opposed to 30% of women, prefer the Conservative Party to either the Labour or the LibDem 
Party.  The t-test statistic [p-value] of whether the mean Conservative Party support is equal 
across genders is -1.96 [0.050].  This is consistent with the previous findings, which show 
that men tend to lean more to the right than do women. While the theoretical model may 
apply generally, this paper will be silent empirically on other nations.  Women in the United 
States,  for  instance,  are  known  to  be  more  pro-Democrat  in  general  than  men,  and  this 
tendency has grown over the last few decades (Edlund and Pande 2002; Box-Steffensmeier, 
De Boef and Lin 2004).  Greenberg (1998) concludes: “There is no question that, in general, 
women  are  more  likely  than  men  to  favour  activist  government,  the  sort  of  agenda 
traditionally associated with the Democratic Party.”  In modern data, Inglehart and Norris 
(1999)  find  some  evidence  of  a  more  widespread  female  tendency  to  vote  left  in  other 
countries (although in older data this was less common).   14 
 
In  our  data  set,  we  examine  the  avowed  voting  intentions  of  adults.    We  have 
approximately  99,000  observations  on  political-party  preferences.    These  are  from 
longitudinal data (this is an unbalanced panel), and there is much stability, year-on-year, in a 
person’s political views.  In the entire population a little more than a third of people express a 
preference  for  the  Conservatives  and  a  little  less  than  two-thirds  of  people  express  a 
preference  for  the  other  parties.    This  was  a  fairly  left-leaning  period  in  British  modern 
history; Mr Tony Blair headed the Labour Party, and was in power, for much of this time.  In 
the raw data on lottery winners, the split between men and women is similar (again, nearly 
two thirds of the population being left-leaning), although this makes no allowance for size of 
win, different ages, or cohort effects.   
Means and standard deviations for the raw BHPS data are provided in an Appendix.  
We study those aged at least 21 (so that almost all of the sample have finished education) and 
in our main estimation we use longitudinal data on up to 14 years from BHPS Wave 5 to 
Wave 18.  The mean number of children in a household is 0.4 with a standard deviation of 
0.84.    Approximately  2%  of  the  lottery  winners  sample  (the  denominator  here  includes 
people out of the labour force) say they are unemployed; 57% are in full-time employment; 
5% look after the home; 23% are retired; 56% are males; 63% are married; 6% are widowed; 
9% have as their highest qualification a university bachelors degree, while 3% have a masters 
or doctorate; mean age is 49 years old.  These personal characteristics are viewed here as 
additional influences beyond the gender effect studied in the earlier section’s formal model.  
If we examine lottery winners at the year of winning, we have 15,461 observations on 
actual lottery wins (on 6,573 discrete individuals) with winning ranges from £1 to £185k (in 
1996 prices). Keeping in those people who express support for a right-wing (Conservative) or 
left-wing  (Labour)  party,  the  number  of  observations  on  lottery  wins  is  8,984  (on  4,217 
discrete individuals).  We have 541 occasions in which someone wins at least 500 pounds. 15 
 
  We estimate the voting regression equation such as the following: 
           (8) 
where Consit is a measure of individual’s preferences for a right-wing political party (e.g., an 
indicator variable with 0 = vote Labour and 1 = vote Conservatives; or a measure of strength 
of political support with 1 = very strongly support Labour, 2 = fairly strongly support Labour, 
3 = not very strongly support Labour, 4 = Support neither party or no preferences; 5 = not 
very strongly support Conservatives,  6 = fairly strongly support Conservatives,  7 = very 
strongly support Conservatives) for individual i in survey year t;  is log of real lottery 
win (= lottery win/CPI); lnYit is log of real annual total household income 7; Xit
' is a vector of 
personal  and  household  characteristics,  including   gender,  age,  age -squared,  highest 
completed education level, marital status, employment status, health status, number of 
children, trade union membership, homeownership, dummies for socio-economic class of the 
current job, regional dummies, and time dummies. ui denotes individual-specific effects, and 
vit is the error term.     
5. Empirical Background 
As suggested by the theoretical framework,  the aim is   to inquire into whether 
exogenous income makes a difference to political preferences.  The hypothesis to be tested is 
that  after  a  windfall   a  person  will  be  intrinsically  more  favourable  to  a  right-wing 
government.   
Lottery wins are of interest to an empirical social-scientist because they have a quasi-
experimental character.  They have a stronger claim  to be thought of as outside shocks to 
income than does, for example, a conventional earned -income variable.  For this route into 
                                                 
7 Annual total household income is a derived variable, which includes imputed data and imputed flags. The 
flags do not distinguish at the individual level how substantial the imputation was, and variables, which are 
computed from other variables with imputations, may contain widely varying proportions imputed (Taylor et al., 
1998). The imputation is performed using a combination of ‘hot-deck’ and predictive mean matching. 
Consit =a+b1lnLit +b2lnYit +Xit
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the problem to be scientifically persuasive, however, it is necessary for the researcher to have 
access to data on significant wins.  The size of win in our data set varies from tiny (one 
pound)  to  substantial  (approximately  185,000  pounds).    The  exact  question  asked  about 
lottery wins is 
“About how much in total did you receive?  Win on the football pools, national lottery 
or other form of gambling” 
and this was asked in every survey wave from 1996 (Wave 7) to 2009 (Wave 18).  In modern 
Britain, the national lottery is overwhelmingly the main form of gambling relevant to this 
question, so for succinctness we shall refer to this as lottery wins.  For the design of the 
study, any  form  of  gambling windfall would be suitable as  a quasi-experimental income 
shock.   
As an elementary background to the empirical analysis, Figure 1 divides the data into 
three  groups  of  people  and  provides  a  histogram  of  the  probability  of  voting  for  the 
Conservative party.   This figure depicts the simplest kind of cross-sectional evidence.  It 
gives a flavour of the paper’s result.  Political preference here is measured on the y-axis and 
three sizes of prior win on the x-axis.  Figure 1 shows -- for these randomly selected British 
voters -- that people who have had a lottery win are substantially more sympathetic to a right-
wing party.  Among those who have never had a lottery win, approximately 38% of British 
individuals vote right.  That proportion, although it is not reported in the figure, is slightly 
lower for females and higher for males.  By contrast, as can be seen in Figure 1, among those 
people who have had a lottery win greater than 500 pounds sterling (which at the time of 
writing is approximately 800 US dollars), almost 45% of British individuals vote to the right, 
that is, support the Conservative party.  In between, at just over 41%, are those who play the 
lottery and who have had a windfall from the lottery but who have never won a substantial 
amount.  17 
 
Figure 1 is not to be seen as a formal test of the causal role of lottery income upon 
individuals’ political leaning.  Moreover, the histogram does not control for other influences -
- particularly the fact that lottery tickets may be bought in different quantities by different 
income, educational, and social groups (and therefore the observed lottery wins will of course 
be different across these groups).  Nevertheless, Figure 1 offers the first indication that there 
may be a link between winning and voting in a particular direction. 
Figure 2 is longitudinal rather than cross-sectional.  It depicts data on people who 
change political affiliation.  In this figure, we condition on the individual not having favoured 
the Conservatives in the previous year.  Here we are interested, specifically, in people who 
switched towards the right and thus were not previously right-wingers.  The means on the y-
axis are inevitably lower than in Figure 1, because we are now eliminating from the data all 
died-in-the-wool Conservative supporters.  In Figure 2, 13% of non-winners switch to favour 
the right-wing.  By contrast, nearly 18% of the winners who get more than 500 pounds switch 
to the right-wing party (there are 354 individuals, in this special sub-case, who win more than 
500 pounds).  Those who are small winners, as might be expected, lie in the middle of the 
histogram.  As background, Figure 3 provides a plot of the distribution of lottery-win sizes. 
In the later econometric work, an independent variable has been constructed for the 
amount of a lottery win (it is expressed as a logarithm, and is deflated by a consumer price 
index to ensure it is measured in real terms).  As coded, the mean of real lottery win (amongst 
winners) is £223.2 with a standard deviation = £2,923.  For males, the average is slightly 
higher, at £270.4 with a standard deviation of £3,412.  We are unable to control for the 
number of tickets purchased; that number is not recorded in the data set 
6. Principal Empirical Results 
Table  1  begins  with  fixed-effects  regression  equations  for  the  eighteen  years  of 
longitudinal British data.  The dependent variable measures a person’s preference for the 18 
 
right-leaning  Conservative  Party  rather  than  for  the  left-leaning  Labour  Party.  Here  the 
dependent variable is coded from 1 to 7, where 7 is the highest category of support for right-
wing voting (“I very strongly support the Conservatives”).  The mean of this ‘strength of 
preference’ dependent variable is 3.75, with a standard deviation of 1.46.  This latter number 
is determined principally by the wide cross-person variation within the data set; it is not a 
measure of the smaller within-person variation.  Four of the columns in Table 1 are for fixed-
effects ordinary least squares within estimators.  The final column is an ordered logit with 
fixed effects.   That final column, therefore, does not impose the 1 to 7 cardinalization. 
The estimation rests particularly upon information on larger wins.  In total, there are 
541 usable observations on wins of £500+ across all waves (that is, winners who report a 
political preference).  In terms of discrete individuals, there are 422 people. 
In the first column of Table 1, a variable for the size of a lottery win enters positively, 
with a coefficient of 0.02 and a small standard error.  This is a form of switching result.  The 
estimation uses only within-person information and thus captures the fact that lottery winners 
now feel more favourable towards the right-leaning party.  Adjusting for a large number of 
covariates, as in column 2 of Table 1, makes no difference to the estimated coefficient.  As 
would be expected in an annual panel, most of these covariates have coefficients that are not 
significantly different from zero. 
Column 3 of Table 1 provides a different specification.  Here four banded dummy 
variables (the base category is a win of less than 100 pounds) are used.  The variable for the 
largest size of win, namely that for a sum greater than 500 pounds, is positive.  Its coefficient 
is 0.135 with a standard error of 0.046.  Column 4 reverts to the logarithm of lottery winnings 
and shows that the effect of winning is far larger upon males than females.  Column 5 shows 
that the main result holds in an ordered logit with fixed effects. 19 
 
Table  2  probes  the  robustness  of  the  claim  that  lottery  wins  make  people  more 
rightwing.  It  adopts  a  deliberately  simple  specification  and  scrutinizes  a  range  of  sub-
samples (first the full sample; then the first half of the data period; then the second half of the 
data period; then the south of Great Britain; then the north of Great Britain).  By cutting the 
data set into sub-samples in this way, we reduce the available statistical power, and standard 
errors are bound to worsen.  But to do so offers a valuable check on the stability of the size of 
coefficients. 
Looking across the columns of Table 2, it can be seen that, for each of these fixed-
effect estimates, the coefficient on a large lottery win (won 500 pounds or more) is rather 
stable.  The five estimates are, respectively, 0.124, 0.176, 0.122, 0.082, and 0.169.  One result 
is worth noting.  In Great Britain, the north is politically more left-wing than the south.  What 
emerges in this exercise is that the lottery-win variable has a larger positive coefficient for the 
North than for the South.  One implication is potentially of interest.  It is that in a left-leaning 
area the consequences of winning the lottery may be to induce a larger switch to the right.  
This is reminiscent of a finding in Gelman et al. (2007), which comes from pooled cross-
sectional  rather  than  panel  data,  that  in  poor  US  states  the  rich  are  more  likely  to  vote 
Republican than rich people are in prosperous US states. 
Table 3 sets out results in a different form of econometric specification.  This is for 
the  one-zero  dependent  variable  ‘I  would  vote  for  the  Conservative  Party  in  an  election 
tomorrow’, which for statistical purposes has the drawback that it does not allow us to detect 
movement, after a lottery win, within the scale of support for the rightwing, so it offers less 
statistical  information  to  a  researcher.  Nevertheless,  although  the  standard  errors  are 
fractionally worse, the tenor of the findings is the same as in Tables 1 and 2.  After a lottery 
win, people lean rightwards. 20 
 
 A possible concern – raised by a reader – is about the direction of causality.  Might it 
be that people who play the lottery are systematically different than people who do not (for 
example, they might be more self-interested, and so more likely to switch views when they 
move from being poor to rich)?  It is not possible to guard against this possibility in a perfect 
way, but (i) a pragmatic answer is that a huge percentage of the British public play the lottery 
so whatever these unobservable characteristics might be they are shared by a large proportion 
of our studied sample, and (ii) by using fixed-effects equations we are able to control for 
vertical intercept shifts in such unobservable influences. 
To  explore  more  formally  whether  causality  might  be  flowing  in  the  opposite 
direction from the one we postulate, we can examine Table 4.  It takes as its dependent 
variable, in a fixed effects regression, the amount of the lottery win in time t+1.  The key 
point for the paper is that being Conservative in period t is not significantly correlated with 
having a lottery win in period t+1.  Indeed the sign in each column is negative.  Some of the 
personal controls in Table 4 are significant.  This does not imply that divorced people, say, 
are  better  at  guessing  the  likely  lottery  numbers.    It  does  tell  us  that,  other  things  held 
constant, divorced people seem to play the lottery more assiduously.     
Supplementary  results  are  provided  in  the  paper’s  Appendix.  They  use  different 
methods, including GLS random effects estimation, and produce complementary findings.   
7. Discussion 
This study is an attempt to understand the causal determinants of people’s political 
views.  Methodologically, it is designed as a contribution to an emerging literature on causal 
inference.   
Our  work  tries  to  explore  the  roots  of  the  well-known  cross-sectional  correlation 
between having high income and holding right-wing views.  By using information on the size 
of lottery wins, which we treat as offering quasi-experimental insight into the consequences 21 
 
of exogenous shocks to income and wealth, this study finds support for the idea that money 
makes people lean to the right.  Our results are consistent with a self-interest model of voting.  
These lottery-win effects are, intriguingly, found predominantly among males.  We are not 
certain  why.  Other  than  the  theoretical  explanation  outlined  in  Section  3,  one  possible 
interpretation of the gender difference may be because, in our data set, men tended to win 
approximately £150 more than women from the lottery. They also tended to win more often 
than did women; the average numbers of ‘years of winning the lottery’ for the same person 
are 2.8 for men and 2.4 for women. Our study has also documented evidence for the role of 
money in shaping attitudes to what counts as a fair division of wealth in society.  We show 
that an increase in a person’s overall household income in year t is associated with a rise in 
their belief in the justice of the current wealth distribution in society. 
How large are the effects of a lottery win upon the probability of voting right?  The 
answer from Figures 1 and 2 is: a number of percentage points.  It is four percentage points in 
the case of the Figure 2 switchers.  An alternative way to state this is that the effect of 500+ 
pounds is, from Table 1 and Table 2, approximately 0.13 points on a strength-of-support 
scale that is cardinalized from 1 to 7.  This is just under half the consequences of completing 
a good standard of education (namely, A-levels) at high school. 8     
Lottery studies are not flawless.  As Doherty et al. (2006) explains, the perfect lottery 
study  would  be  one  in  which  researchers  were  able  to  observe  the  number  of  tickets 
purchased by every person in the sample.  Ours, like theirs, and like every other lottery study 
in social science known to us, is unable to do that.  However, we have the unusual advantage 
that we are able to observe people before and after a win.  We can therefore adjust for within-
person factors.   Then any bias could not stem from personality fixed-effect characteristics of 
people but would instead have to come from an abrupt unexplained change in a person’s 
                                                 
8 Intriguingly, people who become unemployed appear more likely to become rightwing.  This might be a form of protest 
vote, however, because the left-leaning Labour party was in power for most of the period under study.   22 
 
political preferences within a single year that (i) was not caused by the serendipitous lottery 
win in that year, (ii) was for some unexplained reason correlated with that win, and (iii) was 
somehow of a kind by which the larger the win the greater the tendency to switch away from 
left-wing voting.  
8. Conclusions  
This  study  is  designed  as  a  step  on  the  path  towards  a  causal  understanding  of 
people’s voting choices.  Currently, the determinants of individuals’ attitudes to politics and 
redistribution are largely unknown.  In this paper we have suggested a way to study one 
important  aspect  of  this  problem.    We  have  examined  data  on  lottery  winners  in  Great 
Britain.  By comparing people before and after a lottery windfall, we have provided evidence 
that winners tend to support a right-wing political party, and also to be intrinsically less 
egalitarian.  This money-to-right-leaning relationship is particularly strong for males (we are 
not certain why).  It is also of a ‘dose-response’ kind: the larger the win, the more people tilt 
to the right.  The study’s conclusions are robust to different estimators and to controls for a 
large set of possible confounding influences.   Its key findings are not driven by omitted 
personality factors.   
To our knowledge, these are the first fixed-effects results of their kind, either in the 
economics literature or the political science literature.  The results are consistent with the 
view that individuals’ political beliefs are shaped partly by self-interest and not solely by 
disinterested ethical opinions.9 
     
                                                 
9 As a referee has pointed out, they are also consistent, if we take the earlier model literally, with the idea that people have 
relative risk aversion greater than unity.   23 
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Figure 1   Simple Cross-Sectional Evidence: The Percentage of People Who Vote Right 
(Conservative) by the Size of any Prior Lottery Win 
 
Source: BHPS Data, Waves 7-18 
 
 
Notes: In this figure, Conservative = 1 and Labour/Lib Dem = 0.  There are 80,156 observations of £0 lottery 
win; 8,525 observations of small win, i.e. £1-£499; and 541 observations of medium-large win, i.e. £500+.  Four 
standard error bars (two below, two above) are presented.  These are raw, unadjusted means in the data.  
Winners are those who have ever reported a win. 
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Figure 2   Evidence on Switchers: The Percentage of People Who Switched Right 
(Conservative), and Previously Did Not Vote Conservative, After a Lottery Win 
Source: BHPS Data, Waves 7-18 
 
 
Notes: There are 48,177 observations of £0 win (or people who did not participate in the lottery); 5,675 
observations of small win, i.e., £1-£499; and, in this particular sub-sample, 354 observations of medium-large 
wins, i.e. £500+. Four standard error bars (2 above and 2 below). These are raw, unadjusted means in the data 
set.   
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Figure 3   The Frequency Distribution of (Log) Real Lottery Wins in the BHPS Dataset 
 
 
 
 
The vertical axis gives a proportion; the horizontal axis is the logarithm of the size of a win.   
 
A log windfall of 5 is approximately £150. A log windfall of 8 is approximately £2800.   
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Table 1: Fixed-effects Equations for the Strength of Rightwing Voting (denoted RW 
voting) 
 
 
  
  OLS with Fixed Effects   
  Ordered 
Logit with 
Fixed Eff. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5) 
VARIABLES 
Strength of 
RW voting 
Strength of 
RW voting 
Strength of 
RW voting 
Strength of 
RW voting 
  Strength of 
RW voting 
                   
Ln(real lottery win)  0.0210***  0.0209*** 
 
    0.0982*** 
 
[0.00792]  [0.00794] 
 
    [0.0367] 
Won £100-£249 
   
0.0287     
 
     
[0.0307]     
  Won £250-£499 
   
0.0287     
 
     
[0.0446]     
  Won £500+ 
   
0.135***     
 
     
[0.0460]     
  Females × ln(real lottery win) 
     
0.00291     
       
[0.0128]     
Males × ln(real lottery win) 
     
0.0321***     
       
[0.0101]     
Ln(real household income) 
 
-0.0248  -0.0236  -0.0248    -0.112 
   
[0.0256]  [0.0256]  [0.0255]    [0.115] 
Age   0.00862  0.00526  0.00540  0.00450    0.0538 
 
[0.0406]  [0.0408]  [0.0408]  [0.0408]    [0.181] 
Age-squared  5.31e-05  6.58e-05  6.86e-05  6.44e-05    0.000205 
 
[9.01e-05]  [9.79e-05]  [9.79e-05]  [9.78e-05]    [0.000435] 
Completed higher degree 
 
-0.226  -0.230  -0.224    0.246 
   
[0.288]  [0.288]  [0.288]    [1.572] 
Completed 1st degree 
 
-0.167  -0.183  -0.170    0.132 
   
[0.227]  [0.227]  [0.227]    [1.391] 
Completed HND, HNC 
 
-0.409  -0.414  -0.394    18.25 
   
[0.351]  [0.351]  [0.351]    [4,785] 
Completed A-levels 
 
0.355*  0.342*  0.358*    2.699** 
   
[0.202]  [0.202]  [0.202]    [1.315] 
Completed O-levels 
 
-0.0720  -0.0782  -0.0671    0.489 
   
[0.171]  [0.171]  [0.171]    [1.005] 
Completed CSE levels 
 
0.0206  0.0291  0.0370    0.117 
   
[0.811]  [0.811]  [0.811]    [0.276] 
Living as couple 
 
-0.0272  -0.0298  -0.0259    -0.0218 
   
[0.0580]  [0.0580]  [0.0580]    [0.376] 
Widowed 
 
-0.0852  -0.0872  -0.0830    0.650 
   
[0.0895]  [0.0897]  [0.0895]    [0.484] 
Divorced 
 
0.00638  0.00652  0.00459    -0.965* 
   
[0.0938]  [0.0939]  [0.0938]    [0.548] 
Separated 
 
-0.177  -0.176  -0.177    0.200 
   
[0.109]  [0.109]  [0.109]    [0.381] 30 
 
Never married 
 
0.0259  0.0311  0.0275    0.246 
   
[0.0840]  [0.0842]  [0.0840]    [1.572] 
Employed full-time 
 
-0.0608  -0.0582  -0.0652    0.138 
   
[0.0883]  [0.0883]  [0.0883]    [0.373] 
Unemployed 
 
0.231*  0.225*  0.225*    1.332** 
   
[0.128]  [0.128]  [0.128]    [0.565] 
Retired 
 
0.0202  0.0206  0.0169    0.517 
   
[0.105]  [0.105]  [0.105]    [0.448] 
Maternity leave 
 
-0.276  -0.282  -0.285    -1.115 
   
[0.191]  [0.191]  [0.191]    [1.230] 
Family care 
 
0.0764  0.0815  0.0737    0.760 
   
[0.111]  [0.111]  [0.111]    [0.484] 
Full-time student 
 
-0.546***  -0.548***  -0.551***    -0.979 
   
[0.164]  [0.164]  [0.164]    [0.771] 
Disabled 
 
0.126  0.131  0.123    0.937* 
   
[0.120]  [0.120]  [0.120]    [0.513] 
Government training 
 
0.755*  0.757*  0.747*    2.561* 
   
[0.431]  [0.431]  [0.430]    [1.464] 
Other type of employment 
 
-0.302  -0.305  -0.307    0.531 
   
[0.225]  [0.225]  [0.225]    [1.072] 
Health: Poor 
 
-0.143**  -0.143**  -0.140**    -0.706** 
   
[0.0703]  [0.0704]  [0.0703]    [0.328] 
Health: Fair 
 
-0.129*  -0.129*  -0.124*    -0.470 
   
[0.0734]  [0.0735]  [0.0734]    [0.338] 
Health: Good 
 
-0.104  -0.104  -0.101    -0.443 
   
[0.0743]  [0.0744]  [0.0743]    [0.341] 
Health: Excellent 
 
-0.0808  -0.0808  -0.0765    -0.273 
   
[0.0777]  [0.0778]  [0.0777]    [0.357] 
Number of children 
 
0.000987  0.000403  0.000784    -0.000691 
   
[0.0232]  [0.0232]  [0.0232]    [0.106] 
Member of trade union 
 
-0.0213  -0.0221  -0.0218    0.00544 
   
[0.0384]  [0.0384]  [0.0383]    [0.176] 
Home owner (=1) 
 
-0.0726  -0.0765  -0.0737    -0.418* 
   
[0.0516]  [0.0517]  [0.0516]    [0.232] 
Constant  3.020  4.250*  4.266*  4.295*     
 
[2.229]  [2.270]  [2.270]  [2.270]     
Observations  9,003  8,984  8,984  8,984    3,897 
Within R-squared  0.020  0.045  0.045  0.045   
  Number of person-wave  4,227  4,217  4,217  4,217    972 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%.  
 
The dependent variable is a 7-point variable that represents the strength of a person’s support for the 
Conservative Party versus the Labour Party, and which takes the following values: Labour (very strong support) 
= 1; Labour (moderate support) = 2; Labour (weak support) = 3; Neutral = 4; Conservatives (weak support) = 5; 
Conservatives (moderate support) = 6; Conservatives (very strong support) = 7. 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies (10), regional dummies (20), and 
occupational classes (35) as controls. 
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Table 2: Fixed-effects Equations for the Strength of Rightwing Voting (in various 
subsamples) 
 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  All 
First half of 
BHPS (Up 
to Wave 10) 
Second half 
of BHPS 
(Wave 11-18) 
South of 
Britain 
North of 
Britain 
                 
Won £500+  0.124***  0.176*  0.122**  0.0816  0.169** 
 
[0.0444]  [0.0927]  [0.0590]  [0.0582]  [0.0701] 
Ln(real household income)  -0.0229  0.0475  -0.0109  0.0135  -0.0693* 
 
[0.0256]  [0.0561]  [0.0364]  [0.0347]  [0.0390] 
Age   0.00611  0.104  -0.0141  -0.0816  0.0435 
 
[0.0408]  [0.0875]  [0.0586]  [0.0694]  [0.0531] 
Age-squared  6.74e-05  -0.000518  -1.20e-06  0.000168  -1.01e-06 
 
[9.79e-05]  [0.000421]  [0.000170]  [0.000134]  [0.000147] 
Completed higher degree  -0.238  -0.916  -0.0734  -0.678*  -0.112 
 
[0.288]  [0.841]  [0.618]  [0.390]  [0.499] 
Completed 1st degree  -0.186  -0.414  -0.383  -0.576*  -0.222 
 
[0.227]  [0.669]  [0.462]  [0.330]  [0.376] 
Completed HND, HNC  -0.415  -0.327  -1.745**  -1.113**  -0.118 
 
[0.351]  [0.681]  [0.690]  [0.515]  [0.532] 
Completed A-levels  0.341*  -0.352  -0.00706  0.0567  0.229 
 
[0.202]  [0.618]  [0.311]  [0.290]  [0.309] 
Completed O-levels  -0.0749  -0.609  -0.120  -0.0574  -0.359 
 
[0.171]  [0.476]  [0.294]  [0.201]  [0.351] 
Completed CSE levels  0.0323  -0.573    -0.0668   
 
[0.811]  [0.909]    [0.801]   
Living as couple  -0.0279  0.0558  -0.0416  -0.0423  -0.0746 
 
[0.0580]  [0.127]  [0.0924]  [0.0837]  [0.0853] 
Widowed  -0.0851  -0.245  -0.164  0.0673  -0.279** 
 
[0.0895]  [0.232]  [0.131]  [0.120]  [0.136] 
Divorced  0.00714  -0.0708  0.102  -0.0321  -0.0524 
 
[0.0938]  [0.215]  [0.154]  [0.143]  [0.131] 
Separated  -0.178  -0.0988  -0.0115  -0.331**  -0.0897 
 
[0.109]  [0.233]  [0.156]  [0.139]  [0.192] 
Never married  0.0361  0.173  0.0146  0.0866  -0.0710 
 
[0.0839]  [0.201]  [0.129]  [0.112]  [0.137] 
Employed full-time  -0.0582  0.103  -0.0789  -0.0509  -0.00746 
 
[0.0883]  [0.198]  [0.117]  [0.112]  [0.147] 
Unemployed  0.224*  -0.0501  0.370**  0.185  0.344* 
 
[0.128]  [0.267]  [0.167]  [0.170]  [0.201] 
Retired  0.0218  0.0574  0.129  0.00984  0.0794 
 
[0.105]  [0.224]  [0.142]  [0.137]  [0.169] 
Maternity leave  -0.282  -0.0257  -0.507**  -0.219  -0.176 
 
[0.191]  [0.377]  [0.241]  [0.278]  [0.274] 
Family care  0.0831  0.0457  0.0977  0.0371  0.179 
 
[0.111]  [0.227]  [0.151]  [0.144]  [0.178] 32 
 
Full-time student  -0.546***  -0.466  -0.481*  -0.888***  0.0508 
 
[0.164]  [0.376]  [0.269]  [0.199]  [0.297] 
Disabled  0.131  -0.0685  0.198  0.271  0.132 
 
[0.120]  [0.247]  [0.171]  [0.181]  [0.178] 
Government training  0.762*  1.077  -0.152    0.220 
 
[0.430]  [0.827]  [0.531]    [0.518] 
Other type of employment  -0.309  -0.853  -0.376  0.0390  -0.571* 
 
[0.225]  [0.540]  [0.276]  [0.313]  [0.334] 
Health: Poor  -0.144**  -0.0886  0.00691  -0.0289  -0.226** 
 
[0.0703]  [0.115]  [0.110]  [0.116]  [0.0898] 
Health: Fair  -0.131*  -0.0754  -0.0960  0.0380  -0.264*** 
 
[0.0734]  [0.120]  [0.117]  [0.116]  [0.0972] 
Health: Good  -0.107  -0.0922  -0.106  0.0622  -0.230** 
 
[0.0743]  [0.122]  [0.118]  [0.117]  [0.0990] 
Health: Excellent  -0.0829  -0.0950  -0.0559  0.0962  -0.207* 
 
[0.0777]  [0.130]  [0.121]  [0.120]  [0.106] 
Number of children  0.00106  0.0563  -0.00962  -0.0322  0.0243 
 
[0.0232]  [0.0633]  [0.0381]  [0.0325]  [0.0344] 
Member of trade union  -0.0221  0.0654  -0.0689  0.0435  -0.109* 
 
[0.0384]  [0.0754]  [0.0582]  [0.0519]  [0.0589] 
Home owner (=1)  -0.0772  -0.321***  -0.0846  -0.0419  -0.0788 
 
[0.0516]  [0.110]  [0.0835]  [0.0713]  [0.0788] 
Constant  4.224*  1.716  5.069  7.703**  1.041 
 
[2.270]  [3.922]  [3.158]  [3.120]  [2.518] 
Observations  8,984  4,304  4,680  4,607  4,377 
Within R-squared   0.045  0.062  0.074  0.063  0.069 
Number of person-wave  4,217  2,873  2,456  2,061  2,188 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%.  
 
The key independent variable here is a dummy for whether the person had a lottery win of 500 pounds or more 
in that year. 
 
The dependent variable represents the strength of Conservative versus Labour, which takes the following values: 
Labour (very strong support) = 1; Labour (moderate support) = 2 .... Conservatives (moderate support) = 6; 
Conservatives (very strong support) = 7. 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies (10), regional dummies (20), and 
occupational classes (35) as controls.  To aid subsample size, here the ‘South’ of Great Britain is taken to 
include the regions of Midlands and East Anglia.  Excluding those two from the definition does not significantly 
alter the results. 
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Table 3: Fixed-effects Equations for ‘I would vote Conservative tomorrow’ 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES 
Vote for 
Cons. 
tomorrow 
Vote for  
Cons. 
tomorrow 
Vote for  
Cons.  
tomorrow 
Vote for 
Cons. 
tomorrow 
              
Ln(real lottery win)  0.00533**  0.00501*     
 
[0.00265]  [0.00270]     
Won £100-£249      0.0143   
 
    [0.0107]   
Won £250-£499      0.0199   
 
    [0.0151]   
Won £500+      0.0268*   
 
    [0.0156]   
Females × ln(real lottery win)        -0.00292 
 
      [0.00433] 
Males × ln(real lottery win)        0.00997*** 
 
      [0.00343] 
Ln(real household income)    -0.00429  -0.00388  -0.00396 
 
  [0.00936]  [0.00937]  [0.00936] 
Age   -0.00527  -0.00614  -0.00659  -0.00687 
 
[0.0130]  [0.0132]  [0.0132]  [0.0132] 
Age-squared  -1.37e-05  -8.05e-06  -8.36e-06  -8.92e-06 
 
[3.19e-05]  [3.57e-05]  [3.58e-05]  [3.57e-05] 
Completed higher degree    -0.00990  -0.0117  -0.0145 
 
  [0.110]  [0.110]  [0.110] 
Completed 1st degree    0.0326  0.0275  0.0232 
 
  [0.0781]  [0.0780]  [0.0781] 
Completed HND, HNC    0.0715  0.0670  0.0734 
 
  [0.100]  [0.100]  [0.100] 
Completed A-levels    0.0711  0.0669  0.0707 
 
  [0.0661]  [0.0660]  [0.0660] 
Completed O-levels    0.0666  0.0600  0.0631 
 
  [0.0632]  [0.0633]  [0.0631] 
Completed CSE levels    0.0104  0.00947  0.0116 
 
  [0.0192]  [0.0192]  [0.0192] 
Living as couple    0.00995  0.00951  0.00891 
 
  [0.0344]  [0.0344]  [0.0343] 
Widowed    -0.0220  -0.0207  -0.0217 
 
  [0.0310]  [0.0309]  [0.0309] 
Divorced    0.0108  0.0114  0.0106 
 
  [0.0358]  [0.0358]  [0.0358] 
Separated    -0.0202  -0.0215  -0.0190 
 
  [0.0270]  [0.0271]  [0.0269] 
Never married    -0.00990  -0.0117  -0.0145 
 
  [0.110]  [0.110]  [0.110] 
Employed full-time    -0.0618*  -0.0603*  -0.0652* 
 
  [0.0337]  [0.0337]  [0.0337] 
Unemployed    -0.0398  -0.0397  -0.0433 34 
 
 
  [0.0436]  [0.0437]  [0.0436] 
Retired    -0.0138  -0.0138  -0.0157 
 
  [0.0374]  [0.0375]  [0.0374] 
Maternity leave    -0.0680  -0.0691  -0.0710 
 
  [0.0595]  [0.0595]  [0.0594] 
Family care    -0.0220  -0.0208  -0.0242 
 
  [0.0398]  [0.0398]  [0.0398] 
Full-time student    -0.0867  -0.0874  -0.0923* 
 
  [0.0534]  [0.0534]  [0.0534] 
Disabled    -0.0209  -0.0204  -0.0228 
 
  [0.0418]  [0.0418]  [0.0418] 
Government training    -0.0746  -0.0789  -0.0725 
 
  [0.211]  [0.211]  [0.211] 
Other type of employment    -0.0380  -0.0388  -0.0408 
 
  [0.0820]  [0.0820]  [0.0820] 
Health: Poor    0.00768  0.00856  0.0101 
 
  [0.0228]  [0.0229]  [0.0228] 
Health: Fair    -0.00198  -0.000573  0.00132 
 
  [0.0239]  [0.0239]  [0.0239] 
Health: Good    -0.00444  -0.00271  -0.00231 
 
  [0.0242]  [0.0242]  [0.0242] 
Health: Excellent    -0.00492  -0.00358  -0.00208 
 
  [0.0253]  [0.0254]  [0.0254] 
Number of children    0.00643  0.00637  0.00641 
 
  [0.00776]  [0.00776]  [0.00775] 
Member of trade union    0.00830  0.00821  0.00830 
 
  [0.0122]  [0.0122]  [0.0122] 
Home owner (=1)    0.0213  0.0214  0.0214 
 
  [0.0170]  [0.0171]  [0.0170] 
Constant  0.329  0.396  0.426  0.430 
 
[0.550]  [0.579]  [0.580]  [0.579] 
Observations  5,743  5,728  5,728  5,728 
Within R-squared  0.051  0.078  0.078  0.080 
Number of person-wave  2,981  2,969  2,969  2,969 
 
Notes: As for Table 1. 
 
The dependent variable: Vote Labour tomorrow = 0; Vote Conservatives tomorrow = 1 
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Table 4: Voting Right at Time t Does Not Predict the Amount of Lottery Win at Time 
t+1 
Fixed Effect (Within) Regressions for ‘log of real lottery win at time t+1’ 
 
VARIABLES  All  Women  Men 
Labour = 0; Conservative 
(=1)  -0.0268  -0.100  -0.0145 
 
[0.107]  [0.198]  [0.132] 
Ln(real household income)  0.0628  0.0546  0.0593 
 
[0.0516]  [0.0793]  [0.0713] 
Age   0.191**  0.110  0.293*** 
 
[0.0828]  [0.127]  [0.112] 
Age-squared  -0.000518**  -0.000752**  -0.000420 
 
[0.000211]  [0.000344]  [0.000276] 
Completed higher degree  -1.416**  -0.784  -2.061*** 
 
[0.592]  [0.976]  [0.771] 
Completed 1st degree  -1.114**  -0.761  -1.482** 
 
[0.477]  [0.751]  [0.650] 
Completed HND, HNC  -0.839  2.975*  -2.012*** 
 
[0.653]  [1.611]  [0.770] 
Completed A-levels  -0.840**  -0.273  -1.369*** 
 
[0.415]  [0.763]  [0.530] 
Completed O-levels  0.209  0.820*  -0.429 
 
[0.337]  [0.461]  [0.526] 
Completed CSE levels  0.926  1.689   
 
[1.488]  [1.524]   
Living as couple  -0.383*  -0.571  -0.255 
 
[0.216]  [0.408]  [0.268] 
Widowed  -0.0200  -0.403  0.210 
 
[0.261]  [0.503]  [0.316] 
Divorced  -0.291  -0.581  -0.108 
 
[0.238]  [0.436]  [0.301] 
Separated  -0.507  -0.541   
 
[0.380]  [0.519]   
Never married  -0.194  -0.553  0.245 
 
[0.253]  [0.444]  [0.465] 
Employed full-time  -0.384  -1.019  -0.211 
 
[0.361]  [0.782]  [0.430] 
Unemployed  -0.368  -1.007**  -0.0587 
 
[0.269]  [0.501]  [0.333] 
Retired  -0.729  -0.355  -1.002 
 
[0.783]  [1.533]  [0.928] 
Maternity leave  -0.355  -0.609  -0.216 
 
[0.377]  [0.578]  [0.576] 
Family care  -0.383*  -0.571  -0.255 
 
[0.216]  [0.408]  [0.268] 
Full-time student  -0.0200  -0.403  0.210 
 
[0.261]  [0.503]  [0.316] 
Disabled  -0.291  -0.581  -0.108 36 
 
 
[0.238]  [0.436]  [0.301] 
Government training  -0.507  -0.541   
 
[0.380]  [0.519]   
Other type of employment  -0.194  -0.553  0.245 
 
[0.253]  [0.444]  [0.465] 
Health: Poor  -0.158  -0.133  -0.163 
 
[0.143]  [0.212]  [0.197] 
Health: Fair  -0.179  -0.190  -0.141 
 
[0.149]  [0.213]  [0.213] 
Health: Good  -0.245  -0.327  -0.174 
 
[0.150]  [0.216]  [0.213] 
Health: Excellent  -0.304*  -0.317  -0.273 
 
[0.157]  [0.229]  [0.221] 
Number of children  0.0116  -0.0157  0.0402 
 
[0.0487]  [0.0840]  [0.0627] 
Member of trade union  -0.0394  -0.0912  -0.0138 
 
[0.0786]  [0.136]  [0.0997] 
Home owner (=1)  0.172  0.369*  0.163 
 
[0.105]  [0.188]  [0.132] 
Constant  -5.808  -0.887  -8.490* 
 
[4.538]  [7.206]  [4.979] 
Wave dummies (10)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies (20)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socio-economic classes (35)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  7,401  3,161  4,240 
R-squared  0.032  0.057  0.043 
Number of person-year  3,535  1,635  1,900 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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APPENDIX 
 
This appendix provides additional material, including a number of checks suggested 
by referees. 
In Table A1, for example, a GLS random effects model is estimated for a wide range 
of dependent variables.  It does not adjust for person fixed-effects, so documents essentially 
cross-sectional patterns, although allowing for a random intercept.  The size of a past lottery 
win  enters  positively.    Right-wing  voting  is  especially  likely  among  those  with  high 
household incomes, those with middling levels of education, those who are not widowed or 
divorced, those working on government training schemes or part-time, those who are home 
owners, and those who are not members of a trade union. 
Table A2 provides some simple robustness checks.  First, it estimates the effect of 
household income on right-wing preferences without any allowance for a lottery variable.  As 
can be seen in the first column, the logarithm of real income enters strongly positively.  The 
null  hypothesis  of  a  zero  coefficient  can  be  rejected  at  conventional  significance  levels.  
Second, Table A2 then introduces a lagged lottery-win variable in its second column.  This, at 
the suggestion of referees, is a way to test for the longish-run influence of lottery windfalls 
from before the previous year.  In column 2 of Table A2 the coefficient on lagged lottery-win 
is  0.00414  with  a  small  standard  error  of  0.0018.      Interestingly,  the  household  income 
variable  now  becomes  smaller  and  loses  its  statistical  significance,  which  points  to  the 
possibility that windfalls empirically may have the more powerful effect on political views.  
Column 3 of Table A2 does a form of simple placebo test.  The underlying idea here is the 
following.  If the lottery-win variable plays the role ascribed to it both in our theory and the 
discussion, it is the event of winning a non-trivial amount of money that should alter people’s 
political opinions.  Miniscule wins should, in themselves, have no effect on voting.  The 38 
 
reason is that they do not materially alter a person’s wealth and therefore should not change 
the person’s views on issues such as how people in a society ought to be taxed.  By contrast, 
if the lottery-win variable was standing in, instead, for an underlying omitted variable, such 
as a proclivity for gambling, and that underlying variable was itself correlated with political 
views, then an observed connection between lottery windfalls and right-wingness could be 
spurious.  A simple way to check is to include a variable for people who won only a single 
pound  sterling.    This  is  done  in  column  3  of  Table  A2.    Encouragingly  for  the  paper’s 
interpretation, this “Won one pound” variable has a tiny coefficient that is insignificantly 
different from zero.    
Table A3, at the request of a referee, checks for interaction terms.  It has a dependent 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the person favours the Conservative party and a value of 
zero otherwise.  There is some evidence for an interaction term between being Conservative 
in an earlier period and the amount won on the lottery.  That term is negative in each of 
columns 5 to 9 of Table A3.  Hence being Conservative in a prior period makes right-wing 
voting after a major windfall rather less likely.  This result is not as paradoxical as it looks.  It 
is easiest to understand intuitively when considered the other way around:  being Labour in a 
prior period makes rightwing voting after a major windfall more likely. 
Table A4 explores the relationship between the size of a lottery prize and individuals’ 
attitudes towards redistribution and the fairness of the income distribution.  The attitudinal, 
and key dependent, variable here is constructed from the BHPS survey question:  Do you 
agree that “Ordinary people get a fair share of the nation’s wealth?”, with responses ranging 
from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 5 “Strongly Agree”.   It can be seen in Table A4 that those on 
higher incomes are more sanguine about the state of British society.  They are more likely to 
see the current distribution of wealth as fair.  39 
 
Table A5 studies the possible concern that attrition from the sample might spuriously 
be generating  the paper’s main finding.   It  can be seen  from  the table that large lottery 
winners do not leave the BHPS sample.   
On the suggestions of referees, Tables A6 and A7 are also reported.  The first of these 
is a check for the consequences of an inheritance.  There is some weak evidence of an effect 
upon a person’s political stance, and the male and female coefficients are almost identical, so 
this issue may merit further research on larger samples of inheritees.  The second, Table A7, 
reveals weak evidence for long-lived effects of lottery wins. 
Table A8, on further readers’ suggestions, details some more information about a 
particular kind of switching.  Table A9 gives descriptive statistics. 
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Table A1: Regression Equations for the Probability of Voting Right  
Estimated by GLS Random Effects 
 
VARIABLES 
Labour = 0; 
Cons = 1 
Labour/Lib 
Dem = 0; 
Cons = 1 
Labour = 0; 
Cons/Lib 
Dem = 1 
Cons/Labour 
Strength 
Vote for 
Cons or 
Labour 
tomorrow 
                 
Ln(real lottery win)  0.00482**  0.00452**  0.00300  0.0224***  0.00541** 
 
[0.00210]  [0.00216]  [0.00242]  [0.00715]  [0.00225] 
Ln(real household income)  0.0215***  0.0239***  0.0251***  0.0343  0.00900 
 
[0.00656]  [0.00661]  [0.00737]  [0.0222]  [0.00730] 
Male  -0.0121  0.00387  -0.0276**  -0.0727*  -0.0229** 
 
[0.0143]  [0.0130]  [0.0137]  [0.0425]  [0.0112] 
Age   0.00157  0.000393  0.00315  -0.00647  -0.00331* 
 
[0.00202]  [0.00197]  [0.00213]  [0.00645]  [0.00188] 
Age-squared  1.78e-05  2.54e-05  2.86e-07  0.000129**  2.32e-05 
 
[1.95e-05]  [1.92e-05]  [2.08e-05]  [6.26e-05]  [1.88e-05] 
Completed higher degree  0.0863**  0.0331  0.174***  0.114  -0.0139 
 
[0.0412]  [0.0373]  [0.0400]  [0.129]  [0.0387] 
Completed 1st degree  0.0919***  0.0314  0.143***  0.175**  -0.00189 
 
[0.0259]  [0.0236]  [0.0252]  [0.0794]  [0.0222] 
Completed HND, HNC  0.149***  0.105***  0.155***  0.331***  0.0464* 
 
[0.0295]  [0.0260]  [0.0276]  [0.0882]  [0.0241] 
Completed A-levels  0.115***  0.0892***  0.119***  0.347***  0.0175 
 
[0.0209]  [0.0195]  [0.0207]  [0.0633]  [0.0170] 
Completed O-levels  0.101***  0.0794***  0.107***  0.339***  0.0120 
 
[0.0183]  [0.0171]  [0.0181]  [0.0553]  [0.0152] 
Completed CSE levels  0.0231  0.0212  0.0296  0.132  0.0191 
 
[0.0366]  [0.0336]  [0.0353]  [0.108]  [0.0265] 
Living as couple  0.0225*  0.0149  0.0280*  0.00959  0.0197 
 
[0.0135]  [0.0136]  [0.0150]  [0.0445]  [0.0131] 
Widowed  -0.0532***  -0.0567***  -0.0398*  -0.0792  -0.00250 
 
[0.0201]  [0.0203]  [0.0222]  [0.0656]  [0.0202] 
Divorced  -0.0552***  -0.0437**  -0.0445**  -0.0568  -0.0164 
 
[0.0206]  [0.0205]  [0.0224]  [0.0668]  [0.0189] 
Separated  -0.0273  -0.0255  -0.0297  -0.152  -0.00827 
 
[0.0281]  [0.0291]  [0.0325]  [0.0955]  [0.0281] 
Never married  0.00421  -0.0116  0.00618  0.0526  -0.00244 
 
[0.0172]  [0.0169]  [0.0183]  [0.0553]  [0.0154] 
Employed full-time  -0.0496**  -0.0251  -0.0320  -0.0861  -0.0540* 
 
[0.0243]  [0.0257]  [0.0290]  [0.0839]  [0.0302] 
Unemployed  -0.0393  -0.0395  -0.0327  0.114  -0.0818** 
 
[0.0344]  [0.0355]  [0.0399]  [0.118]  [0.0382] 
Retired  -0.0179  -0.00459  -0.0120  -0.0257  -0.0485 
 
[0.0285]  [0.0297]  [0.0333]  [0.0982]  [0.0335] 
Maternity leave  -0.0442  -0.0502  -0.0881  -0.301*  -0.0583 41 
 
 
[0.0514]  [0.0529]  [0.0594]  [0.176]  [0.0526] 
Family care  -0.0181  0.00758  -0.00322  0.0372  -0.0348 
 
[0.0298]  [0.0308]  [0.0347]  [0.102]  [0.0349] 
Full-time student  -0.0670*  0.000369  0.0139  -0.297**  -0.0689 
 
[0.0407]  [0.0403]  [0.0450]  [0.137]  [0.0420] 
Disabled  -0.0334  -0.0291  -0.0292  -0.0133  -0.0439 
 
[0.0320]  [0.0334]  [0.0375]  [0.109]  [0.0358] 
Government training  0.217*  0.180  0.150  0.660*  -0.0959 
 
[0.116]  [0.110]  [0.124]  [0.400]  [0.166] 
Other type of employment  -0.121**  -0.0657  -0.0806  -0.180  -0.0741 
 
[0.0612]  [0.0599]  [0.0672]  [0.211]  [0.0734] 
Health: Poor  0.00127  0.0128  -0.00790  -0.0272  0.00660 
 
[0.0190]  [0.0197]  [0.0222]  [0.0652]  [0.0196] 
Health: Fair  -0.00154  0.0152  -0.00106  0.0108  0.000235 
 
[0.0194]  [0.0200]  [0.0224]  [0.0664]  [0.0197] 
Health: Good  0.0114  0.0244  0.0145  0.0548  0.00535 
 
[0.0196]  [0.0201]  [0.0225]  [0.0668]  [0.0198] 
Health: Excellent  0.0178  0.0360*  0.0203  0.105  0.00851 
 
[0.0204]  [0.0210]  [0.0235]  [0.0696]  [0.0208] 
Number of children  0.470  0.573  0.335  0.117  0.939*** 
 
[0.458]  [0.448]  [0.472]  [1.358]  [0.300] 
Member of trade union  0.00578  0.00312  0.00257  -0.00670  0.00346 
 
[0.00557]  [0.00563]  [0.00621]  [0.0185]  [0.00549] 
Home owner (=1)  -0.0227**  -0.0341***  -0.0354***  -0.132***  -0.0132 
 
[0.00957]  [0.00962]  [0.0107]  [0.0321]  [0.00937] 
Constant  0.0188  0.0837  0.159  3.747***  0.162 
 
[0.130]  [0.131]  [0.146]  [0.435]  [0.159] 
Wave dummies (10)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies (20)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socio-economic classes (35)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Overall R-squared  0.1390  0.1376  0.1237  0.1104  0.0725 
Observations  8,984  10,674  10,674  8,984  5,728 
Number of person-wave  4,217  4,881  4,881  4,217  2,969 
 
Notes: In Great Britain, the Conservative Party is to the right, the Labour Party is to the left, and the Liberal 
Democrats although less well-defined is traditionally more centrist. The principal BHPS survey question, which 
is used here in the first three columns, is:  Which party do you regard yourself as being closer to than the 
others?  The fourth column uses a strength of opinion variable; the fifth relies on a question about which party 
would you vote for if there were an election tomorrow. 
*<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
(1)  Labour = 0; Conservatives = 1 
(2)  Labour/Lib Dem = 0; Conservatives = 1 
(3)  Labour = 0; Conservatives/Lib Dem = 1 
(4)  Labour (very strong support) = 1; Labour (moderate support) = 2; Labour (weak support) = 3; 
Conservatives (weak support) = 4; Conservatives (moderate support) = 5; Conservatives (very strong 
support) = 6 
(5)  Vote Labour tomorrow = 0; Vote Conservatives tomorrow = 1 42 
 
Table A2: Robustness Checks (with a lag-of-lottery-win variable and a “won £1 in the 
lottery” dummy) 
 
GLS regressions 
 
   Dependent variable: Labour=0; Cons=1 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3) 
        Real lottery win/£1,000  0.00582     
  [0.00489]     
Ln(sum of lottery wins in t-1 and 
t-2) 
 
0.00386** 
 
   
[0.0018] 
  Won £1 in the lottery 
   
0.0091 
     
[0.053] 
Ln(real household income)  0.0218***  0.0062  0.0216*** 
 
[0.0065]  [0.0051]  [0.0066] 
Observations  8,984  11,708  8,984 
 
Notes: **<5%; ***<1%.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Control variables are as in Table 1.   
 
The “Won £1 in the lottery” variable is a placebo-variable robustness check; as required, its coefficient is small 
and insignificantly different from zero.  When “Ln lottery win” is entered without the logarithmic form the 
coefficient is large and positive but its t-statistic is only 1.2.  
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Table A3: Testing for Interaction Effects Between Voting Right at t-1 and the Amount Won at t Upon Voting Right at t (GLS – Random 
Effects)  
 
   Dependent variable: Labour/Lib Dem=0; Cons=1 
VARIABLES  All  Women  Men  All  Women  Men  All  Women  Men 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Ln(real lottery win) 
0.00485*
*  -0.00050 
0.0081**
* 
0.00498*
*  0.00495  0.00386 
0.00635*
*  0.00144 
0.00914*
* 
 
[0.00211]  [0.00331]  [0.00276]  [0.00236]  [0.00349]  [0.00320]  [0.00276]  [0.00426]  [0.00364] 
Cons1 at t-1: Labour=0; 
Cons=1 
     
0.843***  0.890***  0.799*** 
     
       
[0.0144]  [0.0211]  [0.0198] 
      Cons 2 at t-1: Others=0; 
Cons=1 
           
0.485***  0.540***  0.447*** 
             
[0.0181]  [0.0279]  [0.0238] 
Cons 1  Ln(real lottery win) 
     
-0.0071**  -0.0092*  -0.00428 
     
       
[0.00358]  [0.00537]  [0.00483] 
      Cons 2  Ln(real lottery win) 
           
-0.00847*  -0.0110  -0.00636 
             
[0.00441]  [0.00693]  [0.00575] 
Ln(real household income) 
0.0212**
*  0.00714 
0.0317**
* 
0.0151**
*  0.0113  0.0202**  0.0161**  0.00551  0.0217** 
 
[0.00661]  [0.00963]  [0.00923]  [0.00550]  [0.00773]  [0.00794]  [0.00694]  [0.0101]  [0.00973] 
Constant  0.0439  -0.0676  0.0712  0.0102  0.139  -0.0909  0.156  0.243  0.138 
 
[0.138]  [0.246]  [0.163]  [0.104]  [0.207]  [0.127]  [0.138]  [0.251]  [0.163] 
Overall R-squared  0.1376  0.1503  0.1319  0.8620  0.8749  0.8532  0.6367  0.6533  0.6187 
Observations  8,864  3,785  5,079  7,106  3,021  4,085  8,350  3,584  4,766 
Number of person-year  4,171  1,919  2,252  3,253  1,497  1,756  3,856  1,786  2,070 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables are as in Table 1. 
Dependent variable: Labour = 0; Cons = 1. Cons1 at t-1 represents Labour =0; Cons = 1 at t-1/ Cons2 at t-1 represents Others = 0; Cons = 1.44 
 
Table A4: An Alternative Dependent Variable: Attitudes to Whether Others Have a Fair Share of Wealth  
                  (GLS – Random Effects) 
 
 
Dependent variable: “Do ordinary people get a fair share of the nation’s wealth?”  
1 = strongly disagree”, ..., 5 = “strongly agree” 
   All  Women  Men  All  Women  Men 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ln(real lottery win)  0.0165*  0.00889  0.0241**  0.00100  0.00470  0.00253 
 
[0.00867]  [0.0131]  [0.0117]  [0.0102]  [0.0152]  [0.0140] 
Others=0; Cons=1 
     
0.0531  0.105  0.0615 
       
[0.0796]  [0.124]  [0.105] 
Conservatives  Ln(real lottery win) 
     
0.0511**  -0.00396  0.0783*** 
       
[0.0206]  [0.0326]  [0.0268] 
Ln(real household income)  0.0722***  0.0551  0.0935***  0.0641**  0.0586  0.0733** 
 
[0.0248]  [0.0375]  [0.0342]  [0.0260]  [0.0393]  [0.0360] 
Male  -0.0340 
   
-0.0208 
   
 
[0.0296] 
   
[0.0307] 
    Age   -0.0298***  -0.0352***  -0.0255***  -0.0293***  -0.0345***  -0.0246*** 
 
[0.00550]  [0.00789]  [0.00780]  [0.00577]  [0.00831]  [0.00817] 
Age-squared  0.000324***  0.000393***  0.000267***  0.000309***  0.000385***  0.000246*** 
 
[5.66e-05]  [8.02e-05]  [8.11e-05]  [5.88e-05]  [8.34e-05]  [8.41e-05] 
Completed higher degree  -0.0733  0.183  -0.179  -0.0560  0.149  -0.135 
 
[0.0971]  [0.176]  [0.121]  [0.0994]  [0.184]  [0.123] 
Completed 1st degree  -0.0220  -0.0109  -0.0464  -0.0173  0.0224  -0.0543 
 
[0.0587]  [0.0895]  [0.0798]  [0.0604]  [0.0925]  [0.0819] 
Completed HND, HNC  0.0584  0.218**  -0.0372  0.0273  0.240***  -0.108 
 
[0.0587]  [0.0884]  [0.0798]  [0.0610]  [0.0908]  [0.0836] 
Completed A-levels  -0.0111  0.0698  -0.0676  -0.0218  0.0895  -0.0913 
 
[0.0441]  [0.0681]  [0.0595]  [0.0453]  [0.0703]  [0.0610] 
Completed O-levels  -0.0210  0.0452  -0.0750  -0.0413  0.0393  -0.0975* 
 
[0.0385]  [0.0529]  [0.0564]  [0.0396]  [0.0547]  [0.0577] 
Completed CSE levels  0.0628  0.0257  0.110  0.0413  0.0382  0.0731 45 
 
 
[0.0681]  [0.0957]  [0.0975]  [0.0701]  [0.0982]  [0.101] 
Living as couple  -0.0279  -0.0201  -0.0322  -0.0390  -0.0484  -0.0320 
 
[0.0417]  [0.0624]  [0.0565]  [0.0439]  [0.0656]  [0.0598] 
Widowed  -0.00119  0.108  -0.179*  0.0127  0.123  -0.172* 
 
[0.0623]  [0.0799]  [0.100]  [0.0636]  [0.0815]  [0.103] 
Divorced  -0.121**  -0.00364  -0.262***  -0.114*  0.0217  -0.265*** 
 
[0.0580]  [0.0783]  [0.0878]  [0.0597]  [0.0805]  [0.0905] 
Separated  -0.257**  -0.182  -0.310**  -0.232**  -0.177  -0.255* 
 
[0.102]  [0.143]  [0.145]  [0.105]  [0.146]  [0.152] 
Never married  0.0434  0.0672  0.0244  0.0363  0.0808  0.00930 
 
[0.0461]  [0.0719]  [0.0622]  [0.0479]  [0.0756]  [0.0644] 
Employed full-time  -0.0165  0.159  -0.0997  -0.0656  0.0567  -0.135 
 
[0.144]  [0.281]  [0.179]  [0.146]  [0.294]  [0.180] 
Unemployed  -0.123  0.0345  -0.152  -0.0191  0.0667  -0.0214 
 
[0.174]  [0.327]  [0.216]  [0.179]  [0.350]  [0.221] 
Retired  -0.0193  0.0962  0.0162  0.0623  0.177  0.0808 
 
[0.161]  [0.305]  [0.203]  [0.165]  [0.319]  [0.207] 
Maternity leave  -0.0378  0.218  -0.616  -0.0945  0.0682  -0.436 
 
[0.238]  [0.333]  [0.924]  [0.261]  [0.369]  [0.915] 
Family care  0.0459  0.245  -0.338  0.143  0.332  -0.263 
 
[0.163]  [0.301]  [0.293]  [0.167]  [0.314]  [0.306] 
Full-time student  -0.0720  0.0218  -0.0460  -0.0787  -0.0515  -0.00818 
 
[0.177]  [0.323]  [0.224]  [0.196]  [0.346]  [0.257] 
Disabled  -0.113  -0.0198  -0.0767  0.0119  0.128  0.0190 
 
[0.167]  [0.312]  [0.209]  [0.171]  [0.326]  [0.214] 
Government training  0.901* 
 
1.003*  0.948* 
 
1.019* 
 
[0.508] 
 
[0.532]  [0.505] 
 
[0.530] 
Other type of employment  0.167  0.334  0.110  0.291  0.584  0.168 
 
[0.253]  [0.495]  [0.304]  [0.273]  [0.546]  [0.327] 
Health: Poor  -0.0230  -0.122  0.0557  -0.0632  -0.152  0.0290 
 
[0.0882]  [0.119]  [0.134]  [0.0917]  [0.125]  [0.138] 
Health: Fair  -0.0867  -0.133  -0.0549  -0.117  -0.187  -0.0405 46 
 
 
[0.0845]  [0.111]  [0.132]  [0.0877]  [0.115]  [0.136] 
Health: Good  -0.0691  -0.109  -0.0381  -0.114  -0.140  -0.0597 
 
[0.0846]  [0.111]  [0.132]  [0.0878]  [0.116]  [0.136] 
Health: Excellent  -0.0135  -0.0916  0.0353  -0.0688  -0.152  0.0163 
 
[0.0879]  [0.117]  [0.136]  [0.0915]  [0.122]  [0.141] 
Number of children  0.0240  0.0109  0.0328  0.0270  0.0186  0.0304 
 
[0.0177]  [0.0259]  [0.0249]  [0.0185]  [0.0269]  [0.0260] 
Member of trade union  -0.0306  -0.0482  -0.0124  -0.0224  -0.0603  0.0104 
 
[0.0330]  [0.0510]  [0.0440]  [0.0341]  [0.0528]  [0.0455] 
Mental distress (GHQ-12)  -0.00552**  -0.00542  -0.00509  -0.00483*  -0.00453  -0.00406 
 
[0.00253]  [0.00346]  [0.00373]  [0.00263]  [0.00360]  [0.00386] 
Home owner (=1)  0.119***  0.109**  0.131***  0.115***  0.119**  0.123** 
 
[0.0321]  [0.0457]  [0.0451]  [0.0341]  [0.0485]  [0.0479] 
Constant  2.474***  3.007***  2.126***  2.601***  3.090***  2.190*** 
 
[0.513]  [0.912]  [0.652]  [0.523]  [0.927]  [0.662] 
Wave dummies (10)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies (20)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socio-economic classes (35)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Overall R-squared  0.0487  0.0725  0.0604  0.0661  0.0795  0.0902 
Observations  5,196  2,276  2,920  4,794  2,108  2,686 
Number of person-year  3,784  1,710  2,074  3,455  1,563  1,892 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Standard errors are in parentheses.47 
 
Table A5: Checking for Attrition: Winning the Lottery Today Does Not Lead to Individuals Dropping out of the Sample 
 
 
Dependent variable: Dropping out of the sample at t+1 
GLS  OLS with Fixed Effects 
   All  Women  Men  All  Women  Men 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ln(real lottery win)  0.00173  0.00242  0.00170  0.000800  0.00277  -2.68e-05 
 
[0.00137]  [0.00204]  [0.00186]  [0.00168]  [0.00256]  [0.00226] 
Ln(real household income)  0.000903  0.0104*  -0.00665  0.00537  0.0137*  -0.000404 
 
[0.00413]  [0.00598]  [0.00577]  [0.00525]  [0.00777]  [0.00724] 
Male  0.0143** 
         
 
[0.00649] 
          Age   -0.0055***  -0.0052***  -0.0055***  0.00385  -0.00789  0.0118 
 
[0.00110]  [0.00154]  [0.00157]  [0.00808]  [0.0120]  [0.0110] 
Age-squared 
5.01e-
05*** 
5.37e-
05*** 
4.42e-
05***  1.67e-05  3.61e-05  8.21e-06 
 
[1.11e-05]  [1.52e-05]  [1.61e-05]  [2.12e-05]  [3.05e-05]  [2.97e-05] 
Completed higher degree  -0.0151  -0.0316  -0.000832  0.0432  0.176*  -0.0378 
 
[0.0203]  [0.0330]  [0.0264]  [0.0667]  [0.103]  [0.0894] 
Completed 1st degree  -0.00524  -0.000819  -0.00249  0.0678  0.211***  -0.0245 
 
[0.0125]  [0.0181]  [0.0173]  [0.0530]  [0.0817]  [0.0714] 
Completed HND, HNC  -0.0191  -0.0316*  -0.00554  0.159***  0.340***  0.0619 
 
[0.0131]  [0.0192]  [0.0180]  [0.0595]  [0.103]  [0.0744] 
Completed A-levels  -0.0236**  -0.0181  -0.0220  -0.0105  0.0905  -0.0635 
 
[0.00983]  [0.0145]  [0.0136]  [0.0483]  [0.0788]  [0.0623] 
Completed O-levels  -0.0153*  -0.0182  -0.00983  -0.000490  0.0473  -0.0168 
 
[0.00877]  [0.0118]  [0.0130]  [0.0445]  [0.0645]  [0.0640] 
Completed CSE levels  -0.0301*  -0.0420**  -0.00916  0.0110  0.0862  -0.0445 
 
[0.0157]  [0.0213]  [0.0230]  [0.0975]  [0.121]  [0.169] 
Living as couple  0.000535  0.00452  -0.00211  -0.00790  0.0141  -0.0198 
 
[0.00770]  [0.0114]  [0.0105]  [0.0116]  [0.0182]  [0.0154] 
Widowed  0.0312**  0.0295*  0.0222  -0.00247  0.0377  -0.0546 48 
 
 
[0.0124]  [0.0152]  [0.0208]  [0.0212]  [0.0266]  [0.0340] 
Divorced  0.00916  -0.00136  0.0222  -0.0176  0.00200  -0.0386 
 
[0.0115]  [0.0150]  [0.0180]  [0.0196]  [0.0265]  [0.0295] 
Separated  -0.00196  -0.0108  0.00258  -0.0135  -0.00374  -0.0276 
 
[0.0168]  [0.0218]  [0.0260]  [0.0214]  [0.0290]  [0.0321] 
Never married  0.0203**  0.0289**  0.0137  -0.00799  -0.0198  -0.0114 
 
[0.00916]  [0.0138]  [0.0124]  [0.0170]  [0.0286]  [0.0218] 
Employed full-time  -0.000751  -0.0273  0.0149  0.00561  -0.0313  0.0284 
 
[0.0170]  [0.0287]  [0.0218]  [0.0191]  [0.0335]  [0.0243] 
Unemployed  0.0261  0.00438  0.0336  -0.000637  -0.0230  0.00699 
 
[0.0225]  [0.0372]  [0.0291]  [0.0262]  [0.0441]  [0.0337] 
Retired  -0.0116  -0.0389  0.00687  -0.00642  -0.0413  0.0178 
 
[0.0199]  [0.0322]  [0.0263]  [0.0228]  [0.0378]  [0.0300] 
Maternity leave  -0.0404  -0.0683*  -0.0966  -0.0522  -0.0953** 
 
 
[0.0327]  [0.0390]  [0.196]  [0.0368]  [0.0448] 
  Family care  -0.00706  -0.0313  -0.00269  -0.0113  -0.0435  -0.0149 
 
[0.0204]  [0.0316]  [0.0487]  [0.0236]  [0.0370]  [0.0570] 
Full-time student  0.0983***  -0.00226  0.147***  0.0477  -0.00672  0.0633 
 
[0.0252]  [0.0407]  [0.0328]  [0.0327]  [0.0542]  [0.0427] 
Disabled  -0.0128  -0.0180  -0.0162  -0.0376  -0.0554  -0.0318 
 
[0.0216]  [0.0346]  [0.0287]  [0.0260]  [0.0425]  [0.0344] 
Government training  0.0580 
 
0.0450  0.0142 
 
0.0122 
 
[0.0771] 
 
[0.0815]  [0.0858] 
 
[0.0910] 
Other type of employment  0.00426  0.0236  -0.0301  0.0473  0.0717  0.00781 
 
[0.0364]  [0.0550]  [0.0497]  [0.0412]  [0.0629]  [0.0563] 
Health: Poor  -0.0463***  -0.0830***  -0.0109  -0.0226  -0.0607***  0.00802 
 
[0.0129]  [0.0175]  [0.0187]  [0.0150]  [0.0213]  [0.0210] 
Health: Fair  -0.0576***  -0.0760***  -0.0383**  -0.0303**  -0.0504**  -0.0144 
 
[0.0128]  [0.0171]  [0.0189]  [0.0153]  [0.0214]  [0.0217] 
Health: Good  -0.0580***  -0.0782***  -0.0377**  -0.0294*  -0.0477**  -0.0145 
 
[0.0130]  [0.0174]  [0.0191]  [0.0156]  [0.0219]  [0.0221] 
Health: Excellent  -0.0541***  -0.0800***  -0.0297  -0.0280*  -0.0524**  -0.00948 49 
 
 
[0.0136]  [0.0184]  [0.0198]  [0.0164]  [0.0234]  [0.0231] 
Number of children  -0.00573*  0.00163  -0.0110**  -0.00330  0.00775  -0.0112* 
 
[0.00327]  [0.00471]  [0.00461]  [0.00480]  [0.00745]  [0.00645] 
Member of trade union  -0.000337  -0.0135  0.00788  0.00663  -0.00111  0.0139 
 
[0.00574]  [0.00863]  [0.00778]  [0.00765]  [0.0119]  [0.0102] 
Mental distress (GHQ-12)  0.00127***  0.000853  0.00172***  0.00109**  0.000431  0.00167** 
 
[0.000402]  [0.000541]  [0.000592]  [0.000487]  [0.000674]  [0.000702] 
Home owner (=1)  -0.0315***  -0.0206**  -0.0397***  -0.00530  -0.000728  -0.00636 
 
[0.00622]  [0.00898]  [0.00862]  [0.0105]  [0.0171]  [0.0136] 
Constant  0.283***  0.154  0.383***  -0.187  0.0794  -0.374 
 
[0.0766]  [0.121]  [0.101]  [0.348]  [0.531]  [0.467] 
Wave dummies (10)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies (20)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socio-economic classes (35)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  15,176  6,660  8,516  15,176  6,660  8,516 
R-squared 
     
0.040  0.061  0.046 
Number of person-year  6,483  3,040  3,443  6,483  3,040  3,443 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 50 
 
Table A6: Weak Evidence for an Effect on Voting Right Among Recipients of an 
Inheritance 
Estimated by GLS Random Effects 
 
VARIABLES  All  Women  Men 
Ln(real inheritance)  0.00930*  0.0117  0.0103 
 
[0.00517]  [0.00723]  [0.00803] 
Ln(real household income)  0.0246  0.0330  0.0214 
 
[0.0159]  [0.0211]  [0.0286] 
Observations  1,557  873  684 
 
Notes: *<10%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Labour/Lib Dem = 0; Conservatives = 1.  Personal 
controls are included. 
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Table A7: GLS Voting Equations with Variables for Past Lottery Wins 
 
 
(1)  (2) 
VARIABLES 
Strength of 
RW voting 
Voting Cons 
versus 
Labour. 
        
Ln(sum of lottery wins in t-1 and t-2)  0.00920  0.00386** 
 
[0.00630]  [0.00179] 
Ln(real household income)  0.0162  0.00619 
 
[0.0179]  [0.00507] 
Age   -0.0480  0.000529 
 
[0.0416]  [0.0145] 
Age-squared  0.00274  0.00411** 
 
[0.00625]  [0.00195] 
Completed higher degree  0.148  0.0940** 
 
[0.122]  [0.0389] 
Completed 1st degree  0.149*  0.0731*** 
 
[0.0759]  [0.0249] 
Completed HND, HNC  0.312***  0.134*** 
 
[0.0838]  [0.0285] 
Completed A-levels  0.258***  0.0796*** 
 
[0.0610]  [0.0204] 
Completed O-levels  0.335***  0.0942*** 
 
[0.0533]  [0.0179] 
Completed CSE levels  0.115  0.0167 
 
[0.105]  [0.0359] 
Living as couple  0.0201  0.00412 
 
[0.0393]  [0.0115] 
Widowed  -0.104*  -0.0105 
 
[0.0581]  [0.0173] 
Divorced  0.0127  0.0104 
 
[0.0587]  [0.0175] 
Separated  -0.0854  -0.00204 
 
[0.0761]  [0.0216] 
Never married  0.0875*  -0.00792 
 
[0.0513]  [0.0156] 
Employed full-time  -0.0827  -0.0215 
 
[0.0645]  [0.0180] 
Unemployed  -0.00343  -0.00271 
 
[0.0883]  [0.0246] 
Retired  -0.0127  -0.0209 
 
[0.0773]  [0.0216] 
Maternity leave  -0.195  -0.0224 
 
[0.134]  [0.0373] 
Family care  -0.0354  0.00131 
 
[0.0825]  [0.0231] 
Full-time student  -0.460***  -0.136*** 
 
[0.128]  [0.0361] 52 
 
Disabled  0.0370  -0.0362 
 
[0.0868]  [0.0244] 
Government training  0.446  0.139 
 
[0.318]  [0.0882] 
Other type of employment  -0.116  -0.0536 
 
[0.142]  [0.0396] 
Health: Poor  -0.0207  0.00485 
 
[0.0507]  [0.0142] 
Health: Fair  -0.0555  -0.00772 
 
[0.0516]  [0.0145] 
Health: Good  -0.0283  3.80e-05 
 
[0.0523]  [0.0147] 
Health: Excellent  -0.0173  -0.00718 
 
[0.0547]  [0.0154] 
Number of children  -0.00723  -0.00159 
 
[0.0165]  [0.00484] 
Member of trade union  -0.136***  -0.0173** 
 
[0.0274]  [0.00787] 
Home owner (=1)  0.162***  0.0569*** 
 
[0.0338]  [0.0101] 
Constant  3.772***  0.206** 
 
[0.350]  [0.102] 
Observations  11,708  11,708 
Within R-squared  0.1083  0.1276 
Number of person-wave  4,000  4,000 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%.  
 
The first dependent variable represents the strength of Conservative versus Labour, which takes the 
following values: Labour (very strong support) = 1; Labour (moderate support) = 2 .... Conservatives 
(moderate support) = 6; Conservatives (very strong support) = 7. The second dependent variable 
represents voting preference between 0 = Labour and 1 = Conservative. 
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Table A8: Proportion of people supporting Conservative and not Labour one 
year before winning, at the year of winning, and one year after winning the 
lottery 
 
 Winning status in year t    
One year before 
(t-1) 
The year of 
winning (t) 
One year after 
winning (t+1) 
Did not win/did not play in t  M  0.361  0.366  0.381 
 
(S.E.)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
N  47,983  47,219  45,795 
Winning £1-£499 in t  M  0.382  0.396  0.413 
 
(S.E.)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
 
N  2,958  3,032  2,872 
Winning £500+ in t  M  0.386  0.438  0.428 
 
(S.E.)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.042) 
   N  140  144  138 
 
Note: Certain individuals either did not win or did not play in both t-1 and t+1. 
A number here such as 0.386 in the bottom left-hand corner means 38.6% of individuals before the 
win, and this proportion becomes 43.8% in the year of the win, and 42.8% one year after the win.54 
 
 
Table A9: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Lottery Winners in BHPS 
 
  
All  Female  Male 
Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Voting strength (Strongly support 
Labour = 1, ..., Strongly support 
Conservative=7)  3.749  1.457  3.781  1.420  3.725  1.484 
Voting right (LabourLibDem=0) 
(Lib/Labour=0;Cons=0) 
0.349  0.277  0.348  0.276  0.350  0.277 
Ordinary people get a fair share 
nation’s wealth 
2.414  0.941  2.406  0.890  2.427  0.948 
Ln(real lottery win)  3.591  1.400  3.479  1.367  3.679  1.472 
Ln(real household income)   9.158  0.640  9.100  0.646  9.203  0.632 
Male  0.564  0.496 
        Age  49.003  16.518  50.248  16.423  48.040  16.528 
Completed higher degree  0.026  0.160  0.020  0.139  0.032  0.175 
Completed bachelor degree  0.091  0.287  0.073  0.261  0.104  0.306 
Completed HND, HNC  0.069  0.253  0.061  0.240  0.075  0.263 
Completed A-levels  0.191  0.393  0.141  0.348  0.230  0.421 
Completed O-levels  0.267  0.443  0.305  0.460  0.238  0.426 
Completed CSE levels  0.045  0.207  0.048  0.215  0.042  0.200 
Living as couple  0.119  0.324  0.105  0.307  0.130  0.337 
Widowed  0.062  0.242  0.090  0.287  0.041  0.198 
Divorced  0.047  0.213  0.059  0.236  0.038  0.192 
Separated  0.011  0.104  0.014  0.119  0.008  0.091 
Never married  0.129  0.335  0.095  0.293  0.155  0.362 
Employed full-time  0.569  0.495  0.522  0.500  0.606  0.489 
Unemployed  0.017  0.129  0.012  0.107  0.021  0.144 
Retired  0.233  0.422  0.262  0.440  0.210  0.407 
Maternity leave  0.003  0.055  0.007  0.083  0.000  0.013 55 
 
Family care  0.053  0.224  0.117  0.322  0.003  0.055 
Full-time student  0.010  0.099  0.010  0.099  0.010  0.099 
Disabled  0.034  0.182  0.034  0.181  0.034  0.182 
Government training  0.001  0.024  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.032 
Other type of employment  0.003  0.050  0.002  0.049  0.003  0.051 
Health: Poor  0.000  0.014  0.081  0.272  0.072  0.259 
Health: Fair  0.076  0.265  0.237  0.425  0.214  0.410 
Health: Good  0.224  0.417  0.475  0.499  0.461  0.499 
Health: Excellent  0.468  0.499  0.180  0.384  0.233  0.423 
Number of children  0.438  0.845  0.439  0.855  0.436  0.838 
N  8,984 
 
3,842    5,142    
 
 